Global Equity

First Quarter 2025 Report

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Performance

Total Return (%) Periods Ended March 31, 2025

	3 Months	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years	Since Inception
HL Global Equity (Gross)	-2.01	5.33	3.95	12.51	9.65	9.80
HL Global Equity (Net)	-2.12	4.92	3.54	12.06	9.18	9.18
MSCI All Country World Index	-1.22	7.63	7.42	15.70	9.38	7.67
MSCI World Index	-1.68	7.50	8.09	16.66	10.06	7.88

Performance returns are of the composite. The composite performance returns shown are preliminary. Returns are annualized for periods greater than one year. Global Equity composite inception date: November 30, 1989. MSCI All Country World Index, the benchmark index, and MSCI World Index, the supplemental index, are shown gross of withholding taxes.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Invested capital is at risk of loss. Please read the above performance in conjunction with the disclosures on the last page of this report. All performance and data shown are in US dollar terms, unless otherwise noted.

What's on Our Minds

I…who took the money?
Who took the money away?
…it's always showtime
Here at the edge of the stage
I, I, I wake up and wonder
What was the place, what was the name?
We wanna wait, but here we go again…

–Talking Heads, from the film *Stop Making Sense*

This quarter, global investors have had to grapple with heightened US policy uncertainty, most overtly in the realm of trade but in many other areas as well, from military cooperation to health care to the previous administrations' industrial policy programs. As we cautioned in our fourth quarter 2024 letter, the US political climate has featured policy volatility almost from the outset of the Trump administration. But that chaos has been greater than we imagined, and the vectors of policy shifts have expanded beyond what we expected.

What hasn't changed is our view that US policymaking in the new administration bears many of the hallmarks that we've come to associate over the last 35 years with emerging markets—and not the best-performing ones, either. The erosion of institutional continuity and effectiveness tends to enable more erratic policymaking. This institutional disruption doesn't just affect the regulatory stability that companies rely on to make long-term investment decisions, it also undermines predictability of enforcing contracts with suppliers, service providers, and customers. Just seven years ago, investors howled when Mexican President López Obrador unilaterally canceled the completion of an already-under-construction Mexico City Airport, leaving contracts unpaid and long-term investment plans disrupted. Now, the US government—reprising a pattern from President Trump's business career—is terminating both employment contracts and commercial services contracted for by various government agencies.

In our third quarter 2024 letter, we wrote about our potential exposure to political uncertainty in the US and explained that while we had made no changes in direct response, we did reduce the portfolio's more expensive holdings, which resulted in it being underweight the US relative to the MSCI ACWI Index. In turn, we increased the portfolio's exposure to high-quality businesses that we believe "can grow in the face of whatever challenges lie ahead." Our view of the potential risks was partly shaped by the Trump campaign's focus on China as the key malefactor behind US trade imbalances. That has proven a misjudgment on our part, as early salvos in the new trade war quickly hit China, the US's primary geopolitical rival, but then were re-targeted at its closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and again at its closest allies in Europe and Asia. In a nearby sidebar, Edmund Bellord discusses the possible effects of a sustained attachment to tariffs and other policies aimed at forcing US self-sufficiency, rather than aiming for greater competitiveness. It's been attempted before, to poor effect.

Another area of policy more often seen in developing countries than mature democracies is the practice of governments extracting concessions or favors from companies or individuals in exchange for letting them get on with their normal course of business. The recent case of Taiwan's TSMC investing a further US$100 billion in the US after being threatened by targeted, ultra-high tariffs is a distasteful example of such a commitment being demanded from a company. Especially a company that had already responded voluntarily (and at large scale) to Biden-era CHIPS and Science Act incentives, building a new semiconductor facility in Arizona that is slated to ramp up high-volume, advanced chip production this year.

Our point here isn't to dispute the policies[1] themselves, but rather to highlight the harm to predictability, and by extension to business confidence, from abrupt, poorly signaled shifts and their frequent reversal (and the reversal of the reversals). This is not a business-friendly environment. When the rules of the road become increasingly arbitrary, companies—domestic and foreign alike—become less willing to commit capital. Uncertainty undermines both the appetite for investment and the demand outlook that would justify it. While TSMC's investment commitment garnered headlines, there will be no headlines for the thousands of business projects that quietly get canceled in the US due to rising policy uncertainty. Meanwhile, US consumer confidence is falling as inflation expectations rise in anticipation, rationally, of the higher cost for most of the goods consumers want to buy.

From our vantage point as global investors "here at the edge of the stage," the challenge of protecting and growing our clients' wealth feels more daunting than usual. The world economic order that created vast wealth through open trade and cooperation now faces potentially radical disruption as the US reshapes its own role in

[1] Although we *have* disputed the wisdom of starting trade wars. For the record, we're in favor of greater budget discipline in the US because we're in favor of the US government avoiding being at the mercy of its creditors and resisting the expediency of resorting to inflation to escape its ballooning debt burden. We favor US Treasuries remaining a low-risk, benchmark investment, a feature at the center of the US's attraction as a capital market and reserve currency provider, right up there with the trusted rule of law.

Market Snapshot

- The MSCI ACWI Index fell due to uncertainty around tariff policy and the risk that higher tariffs pose to growth and inflation in the US.
- European markets climbed as German legislators approved a fiscal stimulus package to reenergize Europe's largest economy and significantly expand its defense spending.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI)-exposed companies inside China soared after the release of Chinese AI model DeepSeek, while those outside China fell sharply.
- Rising long-end yields over the quarter in the UK, Europe, and Japan helped Financials outperform in those markets. Tepid spending data as well as poor performance among AI-exposed stocks caused Consumer Discretionary to underperform.

Index Performance (USD %)

MSCI ACWI Index

Sector	1Q 2025	Trailing 12 Months
Communication Services	-2.4	15.5
Consumer Discretionary	-7.6	5.3
Consumer Staples	5.8	7.8
Energy	9.4	2.7
Financials	6.2	21.3
Health Care	5.1	-0.5
Industrials	2.3	5.7
Information Technology	-11.6	4.0
Materials	4.9	-5.2
Real Estate	3.0	7.0
Utilities	6.8	18.3

Region	1Q 2025	Trailing 12 Months
Canada	1.3	9.6
Emerging Markets	3.0	8.6
Europe EMU	12.3	7.5
Europe ex EMU	8.8	7.3
Japan	0.5	-1.7
Middle East	-1.9	21.1
Pacific ex Japan	0.4	6.9
United States	-4.5	8.2
MSCI ACWI Index	-1.2	7.6

Source: FactSet, MSCI Inc. Data as of March 31, 2025.

that order. As stewards of your capital, our task is to see the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be, and anticipate the possible consequences of chaotic and self-destructive economic, business, and foreign policies, even when they stop making sense to us.

The world economic order that created vast wealth through open trade and cooperation now faces potentially radical disruption as the US reshapes its own role in that order. As stewards of your capital, our task is to see the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be.

From a portfolio perspective, our investment process has always prompted us to understand the industry dynamics that affect how a company operates, to grasp and assess the source of a company's superior profitability, and to have insight into whether that source will endure or evaporate easily as foreseeable pressures arise. Thus, we've long harbored an aversion to companies whose profits were especially vulnerable to the whims of capricious politicians. That practice has given us a leg up in parsing our portfolio holdings and potential new investments for companies situated to better avoid the fallout from a damaging trade war, regardless of its origin. That's no small task given the size and interconnectedness of the global economy, and the central role of the US within it. Our experience of investing across emerging markets has prepared us to find resilient, growing companies that are operating well outside the line of fire of volatile or heavy-handed governments.

With the entire global stock market as our hunting ground, we face an ample opportunity set as we pursue sound investments. A process grounded in identifying and evaluating resilient companies and assessing their growth prospects feels particularly well suited to the moment. Many industry and societal trends transcend the political aims of any single administration, and there are products and services—indeed, entire economies—that will grow regardless of shifting policy priorities elsewhere. Moreover, due to the sustained fashionableness of US investments in recent years, we've reduced the proportion of the portfolio's assets in the US, as we've found strong companies outside of the US at more modest prices than in many years; market volatility will afford yet more opportunities to invest in them, or rebuild our holdings in the US, at attractive valuations.

Portfolio in Focus

One of the challenges of quality-growth investing is that the existence of a great business is not a secret known only to us. Strong and sustainable growth is highly valued, and so the share prices of quality-growth businesses can stay expensive for extended periods, as seen in the high valuations of highly profitable US tech-related companies in recent years. Therefore, buying a great business at a good price often requires acting in a time of market uncertainty, but with the advantage of having studied the business and its industry structure well enough to see its long-term prospects more clearly than others might.

During the quarter, there was volatility in the share prices of several quality-growth companies—some of it, but not all, related to trade tensions and geopolitical unease. For example, some of the volatility was triggered by the January release of DeepSeek, a Chinese-developed LLM model that claims to have achieved similar performance to other cutting-edge AI models at a fraction of their cost. As the shockwaves from this announcement reverberated through the semiconductor industry, we were able to purchase ASML Holdings at a price close to our analyst's estimate of fair value.

ASML is the Dutch maker of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that's the world's sole producer of extreme ultraviolet lithography systems needed to fabricate the smallest, most powerful, and energy-efficient chips required for smartphones, computers, and AI data centers. The portfolio held the stock from 2021 through the third quarter of 2024; when we exited, it was because the price seemed to be discounting a great deal of good news. So we chose to lock in gains and look for other investment opportunities that had yet to attract widespread attention. After our sale, the unbridled bullishness for ASML dissipated, with its share price buffeted by concerns over restrictions on sales to China and slower-than-expected orders for its latest chips. We repurchased it at that corrected price, as we anticipate that ASML can continue to sustain mid-teens earnings growth over the next five years.

The portfolio also bought shares of The Trade Desk, another company it has held in the past. Trade Desk is a US-based digital intermediary that helps advertisers automate their ad buying and evaluate the effectiveness of ad campaigns. As an impartial third-party platform, Trade Desk offers an attractive alternative to less transparent, and often conflicted, ad giants such as Google and Amazon.com. Its sales strategy has been successful, evidenced by the company's roughly 30% revenue growth for each of the past five years. However, last quarter's sales growth of 22% fell short of the company's 25% target. When a stock is priced for perfection, which Trade Desk seemed to be, a minor miss can have a major impact, as investors factor in a new sense of uncertainty (indeed, it was the first time since the company's initial public offering in 2016 that it missed its own projections). The share price fell so sharply that it was trading at a significant discount to what our analyst estimates the company is worth.

The quarter's volatility also presented the opportunity to buy HEICO, an American business we've long admired. An aerospace

Portfolio Positioning (% Weight)

Sector	HL	Index	Relative Weight
Health Care	19.8	10.3	
Comm Services	14.4	8.1	
Cash	4.1	–	
Industrials	14.7	10.6	
Real Estate	1.3	2.1	
Cons Discretionary	9.4	10.6	
Info Technology	21.8	23.4	
Energy	2.3	4.2	
Materials	1.0	3.6	
Utilities	0.0	2.7	
Cons Staples	1.8	6.3	
Financials	9.4	18.1	
			-10 -5 0 5 10

Region	HL	Index	Relative Weight
Europe ex EMU	12.6	7.2	
Cash	4.1	–	
Pacific ex Japan	2.8	2.3	
Japan	5.3	4.9	
Frontier Markets	0.0	–	
Middle East	0.0	0.2	
Europe EMU	6.6	7.8	
Canada	1.0	2.8	
Emerging Markets	8.3	10.3	
US	59.3	64.5	
			-10 -5 0 5 10

"HL": Global Equity model portfolio. "Index": MSCI All Country World Index. "Frontier Markets": Includes countries with less-developed markets outside the index.

Sector and region allocations are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant Global Equity composite GIPS Presentation. Source: Harding Loevner Global Equity model, FactSet, MSCI Inc. MSCI Inc. and S&P do not make any express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any GICS data contained herein.

and electronics manufacturer, it is the dominant independent producer of certified replacement aircraft parts. Each part requires approval from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a process that can take years. HEICO's key competitive advantage is that it has mastered the work of obtaining FAA approval, adding more than 500 new parts every year to its catalog, which now consists of roughly 20,000 approved parts. The resulting scale makes HEICO the favored supplier to its customers, primarily airlines. There are over a million parts that go into an airplane, and half of them need to be replaced over the plane's usable life. Because lives depend on these parts, airlines demand impeccable quality. HEICO's replacement parts also offer airlines significant savings compared with parts from the original equipment manufacturers.

The quarter's volatility also presented the opportunity to buy HEICO, an American business we've long admired. An aerospace and electronics manufacturer, it is the dominant independent producer of certified replacement aircraft parts.

We sold our holdings in Adyen and Scout24, recently strong performers that had reached prices we could no longer justify. Netherlands-based Adyen is a payments processor used by retailers, especially in Europe, so that they can accept credit cards and settle customers' transactions. In 2023, following a period of strong growth, the company reported slower-than-expected earnings growth, and its share price quickly halved. Then, as management rebuilt confidence and Adyen delivered on its new, more achievable expectations, the stock recovered. We held on through these gyrations but took the opportunity to sell during its latest rally.

Scout24 did exactly what we hoped it would when we purchased the shares in 2023: consolidated its position as Germany's largest online real estate portal, with double-digit growth in revenue and profits. Its share price reached an all-time high this quarter. Scout24 continues to be a great business, but at this price, it might not be a great stock.

Another great business whose share price has gotten too expensive is Apple. The company needs no introduction: Apple was recognized as the best and most valuable brand in the world in 2024 by Interbrand and Brand Finance. While it has been able to offset plateauing sales in iPhones with revenue from services such as iCloud, Apple Pay, Apple Music, and its cut of App Store transactions, those businesses are maturing as well. The company is also vulnerable to rising trade tensions. Although Apple, because of its prominent name, may stand out from the list of this quarter's transactions, we had been reducing our stake over the past year and this was the last of our shares, the culmination of a seven-year holding.

We also implemented a change to this strategy's risk guidelines. The limit for IT sector exposure in this portfolio has been revised from the current 25% to 30% effective April 1, 2025. This revision reflects how the advancement of new technologies has increased the opportunities for investing in high-quality and fast-growing companies within this sector.

Performance and Attribution

The Global Equity composite fell by 2.0% gross of fees in the first quarter, worse than the 1.2% drop in the MSCI ACWI Index. While the portfolio faced strong style headwinds—as stocks in the lower-quality, slower-growth, and cheaper quintiles of the market outperformed—our stock selection added value across all three style buckets.

First Quarter 2025 Performance Attribution

Global Equity Composite vs. MSCI ACWI Index



Source: Harding Loevner Global Equity composite, FactSet, MSCI Inc. Data as of March 31, 2025. The total effect shown here may differ from the variance of the composite performance and benchmark performance shown on the first page of this report due to the way in which FactSet calculates performance attribution. This information is supplemental to the composite GIPS Presentation.

Portfolio Attribution by Sector

Returns were primarily hurt by poor performance in IT, as a few of our holdings got swept up in the broader market uncertainty around the future of AI.

Top contributors to relative performance:

- Our overweight to the traditionally defensive **Health Care** sector benefited returns, despite the regulatory and business uncertainty stemming from the appointment of Robert F. Kennedy Jr. to lead the US Department of Health and Human Services.
- Stock selection within **Health Care** was also additive, especially Vertex Pharmaceuticals. The company is a dynamo in cystic fibrosis treatments, a franchise that produced better-than-expected earnings growth and a strong outlook from management. Vertex also won FDA approval in January for a promising non-opioid pain drug, another successful result of its differentiated R&D capabilities.

Top detractors from relative performance:

- **IT**-services provider Globant reported disappointing results in February. While sales related to customers' AI projects more than doubled, that revenue base is still too small to offset slowing demand from customers in Latin America, where tariff uncertainty is weighing on business sentiment.
- Also in **IT**, Salesforce, which seemed to be making great progress with its impressive agentic AI tool last year, offered more recent guidance that suggested customer uptake of agentic AI might not be happening as quickly as investors originally hoped.

Relative Returns (%)

First Quarter 2025

Largest Contributors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
Vertex Pharmaceuticals	HLTH	3.4	0.2	0.62
NVIDIA	INFT	0.9	4.0	0.58
Tesla*	DSCR	–	1.2	0.52
Sony	DSCR	2.2	0.2	0.36
Apple	INFT	0.4	4.5	0.35

Largest Detractors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
Globant	INFT	1.0	–	-0.55
Salesforce	INFT	2.4	0.4	-0.41
Alphabet	COMM	4.4	2.5	-0.34
ServiceNow	INFT	1.3	0.3	-0.28
Schneider Electric	INDU	3.3	0.2	-0.24

Trailing 12 Months

Largest Contributors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
Netflix	COMM	3.2	0.4	1.06
Tencent	COMM	2.1	0.4	0.75
Sony	DSCR	1.9	0.2	0.65
Meta Platforms	COMM	4.5	1.6	0.53
Tradeweb	FINA	1.6	<0.1	0.51

Largest Detractors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
Atkore	INDU	0.6	–	-0.78
Globant	INFT	1.0	–	-0.60
NVIDIA	INFT	0.3	3.9	-0.60
Apple	INFT	1.0	4.3	-0.56
Thermo Fisher Scientific	HLTH	2.5	0.3	-0.54

"HL": Global Equity composite. "Index": MSCI All Country World Index.

*Company was not held in the portfolio; its absence had an impact on the portfolio's return relative to the index.

Portfolio Attribution by Region

Good returns in Japan and our large overweight in the top-performing Europe ex EMU region were not enough to offset weak stocks in the EMU and US regions.

Top contributors to relative performance:

- In **Japan**, Sony outperformed due to strong results for its music and gaming divisions. PlayStation 5 sales are 1.4 times what PlayStation 4 sales were at the same point in its cycle; music margins also expanded.
- In **Europe ex EMU**, markets such as the UK and Sweden were buoyed by an improving outlook for Europe more broadly and the region's relatively more stable policies than that of the US.

Top detractors from relative performance:

- In the **EMU**, Schneider Electric, a provider of electrification and energy-management services, underperformed as questions around the sustainability of data-center operators' big investment plans caused investors to second-guess Schneider's own growth prospects. About 20% of the company's sales come from products used in data centers.
- In the **US**, Alphabet's cloud business grew 30%, slower than the consensus estimate of 32%, although management characterized this as a capacity issue, saying that the company is struggling to keep up with demand.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings identified above do not represent all of the securities held in the portfolio and holdings may not be current. It should not be assumed that investment in the securities identified has been or will be profitable. Contributors and Detractors are shown as supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant Global Equity composite GIPS Presentation. The following information is available upon request: (1) information describing the methodology of the contribution data in the tables above; and (2) a list showing the weight and relative contribution of all holdings during the quarter and the trailing 12 months. In the tables above, "weight" is the average percentage weight of the holding during the period, and "contribution" is the contribution to overall relative performance over the period. Performance of contributors and detractors is net of fees, which is calculated by taking the difference between net and gross composite performance for the Global Equity strategy prorated by asset weight in the portfolio and subtracted from each security's return. Contributors and detractors exclude cash and securities in the composite not held in the model portfolio. Quarterly data is not annualized.

Perón's Ghost: When Self-Reliance Becomes Self-Defeating

By Edmund Bellord

Amid the turbulence and mixed signals of the Trump administration's tariff strategy, a discernible tilt toward economic self-sufficiency has emerged. The stated objectives of reshoring manufacturing, reducing dependence on foreign supply chains, and projecting national strength carry political appeal for many, but undoing 50 years of globalization is fraught with risk. Argentina's mid-20th century descent under Juan Perón offers a sobering reminder of how quickly such ambitious efforts can short-circuit, swapping prosperity for prolonged isolation and decline.

Juan Perón came to power on a wave of popular support, winning democratic elections in 1946 and 1951 with an economic agenda focused on achieving independence from foreign economic and political control. At the time, British and American investors dominated Argentina's infrastructure, utilities, and key industries, while the nation's reliance on imported manufactured goods and its commodity-based export economy left it vulnerable to external shocks and fluctuations in global demand.

In response, Perón's government launched a program of economic nationalism centered around Import Substitution Industrialization, with high tariffs often reaching over 100% for some goods to protect fledgling domestic industries. These tariffs made foreign goods prohibitively expensive and gave local producers a captive market.

In addition to tariffs, the regime implemented strict import quotas and licensing systems, restricting both the volume and type of goods allowed into the country. These measures were designed to conserve foreign currency reserves and shield domestic firms from international competition. The government also nationalized key industries such as railroads and energy, shifting control from foreign hands to the state.

Initially, the strategy appeared to succeed as industries such as auto manufacturing, textiles, and steel expanded rapidly. But this protection led to complacency—Argentine cars grew costly and outdated, unable to compete with imports. The heavily shielded textile industry became a major employer but remained inefficient and high-cost, limiting global competitiveness. State-owned heavy industrial companies such as steelmaker Somisa faced similar issues: overstaffing, obsolete equipment, and reliance on government support.

Booming global demand for Argentina's agricultural exports in the immediate post–World War II period had provided the foreign exchange needed to finance the country's industrial push. But as postwar Europe recovered and commodity prices fell, Argentina's export revenues fell sharply. With foreign currency scarce and domestic industries now dependent on protection, the limitations of the model became apparent. Production quality lagged, costs rose, and Argentina became increasingly inward-looking and uncompetitive on the global stage.

What began as a drive for economic sovereignty ultimately resulted in deep structural weaknesses—fiscal imbalances, declining productivity, and persistent inflation—and the onset of Argentina's prolonged economic decline. Inflation escalated from 20% annually in the early 1950s to severe, chronic levels that persisted for decades, eventually culminating in hyperinflation by the late 80s. The policies introduced under Perón cast a long shadow: once one of the world's ten wealthiest nations by GDP per capita, Argentina steadily fell behind its peers, dropping to 79th place by 2023.

While the Trump administration's protectionist turn echoes elements of Argentina's economic nationalism, it lacks several core features that defined the Peronist model. There is no nationalization of industry, nor a broad push to reshape the domestic economy through state planning or import substitution. Instead, Trump's approach reflects a singular obsession with applying punitive tariffs to reduce the trade deficit—ignoring the basic accounting reality that cutting the trade deficit necessarily shrinks the capital surplus.

The flipside of the US trade deficit is its capital surplus, when the US runs a trade deficit—importing more goods and services than it exports—those dollars don't simply vanish. Instead, they return in the form of foreign investment, with foreign capital flowing in to support equities, bonds, and the dollar.

If fewer dollars flow abroad through trade, fewer dollars will be recycled back into US assets. This shift could weaken demand for Treasuries, forcing yields higher and tightening financial conditions across the economy. US equities, long buoyed by steady foreign inflows, would face downward pressure, while a stronger dollar—resulting from tariffs or restricted trade—could further erode US export competitiveness.

In short, efforts to shrink the trade deficit cannot occur in isolation; they will directly impact the capital account, reducing foreign demand for US assets and challenging the fundamental financial stability that has long underpinned US economic dominance.

Argentina's experience vividly demonstrates how pursuing economic self-reliance can become self-defeating, as protectionist policies breed inefficiency, deter investment, and ultimately trigger spiraling inflation. Although the United States today operates in a markedly different context, its sheer economic magnitude, central position within the global economic system, and reliance on global capital flows mean that even a modest inward pivot carries outsized risks. ■

Portfolio Holdings

Communication Services	Market	End Wt. (%)
Alphabet Internet products and services	US	3.9
Meta Platforms Virtual reality and social network	US	3.0
Netflix Entertainment provider	US	3.9
Tencent Internet and IT services	China	2.6
The Trade Desk Digital advertising mgmt. svcs.	US	1.0
Consumer Discretionary		
Amazon.com E-commerce retailer	US	3.7
Booking Holdings Online travel services	US	1.8
Compass Group Contract food services	UK	1.3
Sony Japanese conglomerate	Japan	2.5
Consumer Staples		
Couche-Tard Convenience stores operator	Canada	1.0
Walmart de México Foods and cons. products retailer	Mexico	0.8
Energy		
Shell Oil and gas producer	UK	1.2
SLB Oilfield services	US	1.1
Financials		
AIA Group Insurance provider	Hong Kong	1.4
Bank Central Asia Commercial bank	Indonesia	0.7
CME Group Derivatives exchange and trading services	US	2.6
DBS Group Commercial bank	Singapore	1.3
HDFC Bank Commercial bank	India	1.4
Tradeweb Electronic financial trading services	US	2.0
Health Care		
AbbVie Biopharmaceutical manufacturer	US	1.3
Alcon Eye care products manufacturer	Switzerland	1.7
Chugai Pharmaceutical Pharma manufacturer	Japan	1.7
Danaher Diversified science and tech. products and svcs.	US	1.3
Genmab Oncology drug manufacturer	Denmark	0.6
Haleon Consumer health products manufacturer	UK	1.8
Mindray Medical equipment manufacturer	China	1.6
Roche Pharma and diagnostic equipment manufacturer	Switzerland	1.2
Thermo Fisher Scientific Health care products & svcs.	US	2.2
UnitedHealth Group Health care support services	US	2.8
Vertex Pharmaceuticals Pharma manufacturer	US	3.7

Industrials	Market	End Wt. (%)
Alfa Laval Industrial equipment manufacturer	Sweden	1.0
Ametek Electronic instruments manufacturer	US	1.0
Atkore Electrical conduit manufacturer	US	0.8
Atlas Copco Industrial equipment manufacturer	Sweden	0.8
Diploma Specialized technical services	UK	1.1
Epiroc Industrial equipment manufacturer	Sweden	0.9
HEICO Aerospace parts manufacturer	US	1.2
Honeywell Diversified technology and product mfr.	US	0.9
John Deere Industrial equipment manufacturer	US	2.1
Northrop Grumman Aerospace and defense mfr.	US	0.9
Schneider Electric Energy management products	France	3.1
SGS Quality assurance services	Switzerland	1.0
Information Technology		
Accenture Professional services consultant	US	2.4
Adobe Software developer	US	1.0
Amphenol Electrical components and connectors supplier	US	1.0
Applied Materials Semiconductor & display eqpt. mfr.	US	1.1
ASML Semiconductor equipment manufacturer	Netherlands	1.0
Broadcom Semiconductor manufacturer	US	1.6
Globant IT services provider	US	0.9
Keyence Sensor and measurement eqpt. mfr.	Japan	1.1
Microsoft Consumer electronics & software developer	US	3.9
NVIDIA Semiconductor chip designer	US	0.8
Salesforce Customer relationship mgmt. software	US	2.1
SAP Enterprise software developer	Germany	1.5
ServiceNow Enterprise resource planning software	US	1.1
Synopsys Chip-design software developer	US	0.9
TSMC Semiconductor manufacturer	Taiwan	1.3
Materials		
Symrise Fragrances and flavors manufacturer	Germany	1.0
Real Estate		
CoStar Real estate information services	US	1.3
Utilities		
No Holdings		
Cash		4.1

Model portfolio holdings are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant Global Equity composite GIPS Presentation. The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings shown may not be current. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. It should not be assumed that investment in the security identified has been or will be profitable. To request a complete list of portfolio holdings for the past year contact Harding Loevner.

Portfolio Facts

Portfolio Characteristics

Quality and Growth	HL	Index
Profit Margin[1] (%)	14.8	14.7
Return on Assets[1] (%)	9.4	8.4
Return on Equity[1] (%)	21.6	19.2
Debt/Equity Ratio[1] (%)	35.4	63.2
Std. Dev. of 5 Year ROE[1] (%)	4.7	5.8
Sales Growth[1,2] (%)	10.9	8.5
Earnings Growth[1,2] (%)	13.9	13.1
Cash Flow Growth[1,2] (%)	16.3	11.8
Dividend Growth[1,2] (%)	10.2	8.5
Size and Turnover	**HL**	**Index**
Wtd. Median Mkt. Cap. (US $B)	151.2	133.6
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap. (US $B)	488.0	599.1
Turnover[3] (Annual %)	32.7	–

Risk and Valuation	HL	Index
Alpha[2] (%)	-3.64	–
Beta[2]	1.08	–
R-Squared[2]	0.91	–
Active Share[3] (%)	80	–
Standard Deviation[2] (%)	17.67	15.71
Sharpe Ratio[2]	0.56	0.83
Tracking Error[2] (%)	5.3	–
Information Ratio[2]	-0.60	–
Up/Down Capture[2]	99/112	–
Price/Earnings[4]	26.5	20.9
Price/Cash Flow[4]	18.7	14.1
Price/Book[4]	4.7	3.1
Dividend Yield[5] (%)	1.2	1.9

[1]Weighted median. [2]Trailing five years, annualized. [3]Five-year average. [4]Weighted harmonic mean. [5]Weighted mean. Source: (Risk characteristics): Harding Loevner Global Equity composite based on the composite returns, gross of fees, eVestment Alliance LLC, MSCI Inc. Source: (other characteristics): Harding Loevner Global Equity model based on the underlying holdings, FactSet (Run Date: April 3, 2025) based on the latest available data in FactSet on this date.), MSCI Inc.

Completed Portfolio Transactions

Positions Established	Market	Sector
Ametek	US	INDU
Amphenol	US	INFT
ASML	Netherlands	INFT
HEICO	US	INDU
Mindray	China	HLTH
The Trade Desk	US	COMM

Positions Sold	Market	Sector
Adyen	Netherlands	FINA
Apple	US	INFT
MISUMI Group	Japan	INDU
Rockwell Automation	US	INDU
Scout24	Germany	COMM

The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings identified above do not represent all of the securities held in the portfolio and holdings may not be current. It should not be assumed that investment in the securities identified has been or will be profitable. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Portfolio characteristics are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant Global Equity composite GIPS Presentation. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

Composite Performance

as of March 31, 2025

	HL Global Equity Gross (%)	HL Global Equity Net (%)	MSCI ACWI[1] (%)	MSCI World[2] (%)	HL Global Equity 3-yr. Std. Deviation[3] (%)	MSCI ACWI 3-yr. Std. Deviation[3] (%)	MSCI World 3-yr. Std. Deviation[3] (%)	Internal Dispersion[4] (%)	No. of Accounts	Composite Assets ($M)	Firm Assets ($M)
2025 YTD[5]	-2.01	-2.12	-1.22	-1.68	17.54	16.06	16.51	N.A.	18	6,954	33,889
2024	14.94	14.50	18.02	19.19	18.31	16.21	16.65	0.3	19	8,361	35,471
2023	23.35	22.87	22.81	24.42	18.54	16.27	16.75	0.2	18	10,282	43,924
2022	-29.13	-29.43	-17.96	-17.73	21.13	19.86	20.43	0.2	26	12,189	47,607
2021	16.14	15.68	19.04	22.35	16.42	16.83	17.05	0.4	29	20,188	75,084
2020	31.22	30.68	16.82	16.50	18.17	18.12	18.26	0.3	30	18,897	74,496
2019	30.17	29.64	27.30	28.40	12.56	11.21	11.13	0.2	29	14,139	64,306
2018	-9.35	-9.75	-8.93	-8.20	11.85	10.48	10.39	0.2	30	10,752	49,892
2017	33.26	32.66	24.62	23.07	11.16	10.37	10.24	0.2	27	8,946	54,003
2016	7.13	6.62	8.48	8.15	11.37	11.07	10.94	0.1	29	7,976	38,996
2015	2.65	2.18	-1.84	-0.32	11.16	10.78	10.80	0.5	28	7,927	33,296

[1]Benchmark index. [2]Supplemental index. [3]Variability of the composite, gross of fees, and the index returns over the preceding 36-month period, annualized. [4]Asset-weighted standard deviation (gross of fees). [5]The 2025 YTD performance returns and assets shown are preliminary. N.A.–Internal dispersion less than a 12-month period.

The Global Equity composite contains fully discretionary, fee-paying accounts investing in US and non-US equity and equity-equivalent securities and cash reserves, and is measured against the MSCI All Country World Total Return Index (Gross) for comparison purposes. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. The exchange rate source of the benchmark is Reuters. The exchange rate source of the composite is Bloomberg. Additional information about the benchmark, including the percentage of composite assets invested in countries or regions not included in the benchmark, is available upon request.

The MSCI All Country World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure equity market performance in the global developed and emerging markets. The index consists of 47 developed and emerging market countries. The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure global developed market equity performance. The index consists of 23 developed market countries. You cannot invest directly in these indexes.

Harding Loevner LP claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Harding Loevner has been independently verified for the period November 1, 1989 through December 31, 2024.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The Global Equity composite has had a performance examination for the periods December 1, 1989 through December 31, 2024 The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Harding Loevner LP is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Harding Loevner is an affiliate of AMG (NYSE: AMG), an investment holding company with stakes in a diverse group of boutique firms. A list of composite descriptions, a list of limited distribution pooled fund descriptions, and a list of broad distribution pooled funds are available upon request.

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite performance is presented gross of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income and capital gains. Additional information is available upon request. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

The US dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented both gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net returns are calculated using actual fees. Actual returns will be reduced by investment advisory fees and other expenses that may be incurred in the management of the account. The standard fee schedule generally applied to separate Global Equity accounts is 1.00% annually of the market value for the first $20 million; 0.50% for the next $80 million; 0.45% for the next $150 million; 0.40% for the next $250 million; above $500 million upon request. The management fee schedule and total expense ratio for the Global Equity Collective Investment Fund, which is included in the composite, are 0.70% on all assets and 0.75%, respectively. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year.

The Global Equity composite was created on November 30, 1989 and the performance inception date is December 1, 1989.

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