

What's Inside

Market Review →

International stocks and bonds fell precipitously as interest rate hikes provoked by soaring consumer prices threatened a global recession.

Performance and Attribution →

Sources of relative return by sector and region.

Perspective and Outlook →

Historically, an overweight to the highest-quality companies has helped in market routs. In this one it has hurt (so far). But that also puts us in a more favorable position to find excellent companies whose shares are priced to perform well in the years ahead.

Portfolio Highlights →

As central banks around the world have begun to raise interest rates over the past year, the growth outlook for some financial companies has brightened considerably.

Portfolio Holdings →

Information about the companies held in the portfolio.

Portfolio Facts →

Contributors, detractors, characteristics, and completed transactions.

Get More Online

Insights →

View other reports.

Composite Performance

Total Return (%) — Periods Ended June 30, 2022¹

	3 Months	YTD	1 Year	3 Years ²	5 Years ²	10 Years ²	Since Inception ^{2,3}
HL EAFE Equity (Gross of Fees)	-16.65	-23.88	-19.74	4.30	5.76	8.54	8.12
HL EAFE Equity (Net of Fees)	-16.76	-24.08	-20.15	3.77	5.22	7.94	7.52
MSCI EAFE Index ^{4,5}	-14.29	-19.25	-17.33	1.54	2.69	5.88	5.07

¹The Composite performance returns shown are preliminary; ²Annualized Returns; ³Inception Date: February 28, 2010; ⁴The benchmark index; ⁵Gross of withholding taxes.

Past Performance does not guarantee future results. Invested capital is at risk of loss. Please read the above performance in conjunction with the footnotes on the last page of this report. All performance and data shown are in US dollar terms, unless otherwise noted.

Portfolio Positioning (% Weight)

Sector	HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE	Under / Over
Info Technology	12.1	7.8	4.3
Materials	11.8	7.5	4.3
Cash	3.9	—	3.9
Financials	20.0	17.7	2.3
Health Care	15.4	13.8	1.6
Industrials	16.5	14.9	1.6
Cons Staples	11.6	10.8	0.8
Energy	3.2	4.8	-1.6
Real Estate	0.0	2.9	-2.9
Utilities	0.5	3.5	-3.0
Comm Services	1.7	5.0	-3.3
Cons Discretionary	3.3	11.3	-8.0

Geography	HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE	Under / Over
Emerging Markets	8.2	—	8.2
Canada	4.4	—	4.4
Cash	3.9	—	3.9
Other ⁶	1.7	—	1.7
Frontier Markets ⁷	0.0	—	0.0
Middle East	0.0	0.8	-0.8
Pacific ex-Japan	11.3	12.8	-1.5
Europe ex-EMU	29.4	33.4	-4.0
Europe EMU	25.1	30.8	-5.7
Japan	16.0	22.2	-6.2

⁶Includes companies classified in the United States. ⁷Includes countries with less-developed markets outside the Index.

Sector and geographic allocations are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant EAFE Equity Composite GIPS Presentation. Source: Harding Loevner EAFE Equity Model; MSCI Inc. and S&P. MSCI Inc. and S&P do not make any express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any GICS data contained herein.

This page intentionally left blank.

Market Review

International stocks and bonds fell precipitously as interest rate hikes provoked by soaring consumer prices threatened a global recession. This year's rout has wiped over US\$5 trillion from non-US stock markets.

Inflation in most developed economies continued to climb, reaching the highest level in a generation. Lingering supply chain disruptions, food and energy shortages worsened by the Ukrainian conflict, and resurgent consumer demand post-pandemic contributed to rising prices. Central banks, having previously insisted that price pressures were transitory, were forced to make a U-turn, setting out aggressive plans to regain the upper hand and restore price stability. The US Federal Reserve boosted its benchmark interest rate by 0.75%—the largest single increase in 28 years—after a worse-than-expected 8.6% rise in consumer prices in May and pledged to increase rates until inflation is under control. Central bankers in the UK, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland all raised borrowing rates, along with numerous Emerging Markets (EMs) central banks. The European Central Bank, despite faltering economic growth, previewed a July rate increase that will be its first in 11 years and hinted at additional hikes in the months ahead. An exception was the Bank of Japan, which remains committed to its ultra-accommodative monetary policy. All these factors weighed on the economic outlook; in the World Bank's most recent forecast, global growth slows to 2.9% in 2022—a marked drop from the 4.1% growth it forecast a mere five months earlier.

MSCI EAFE Index Performance (USD %)

Sector	2Q 2022	Trailing 12 Months
Communication Services	-10.8	-19.9
Consumer Discretionary	-15.3	-27.2
Consumer Staples	-8.1	-13.8
Energy	-3.9	22.2
Financials	-13.5	-11.6
Health Care	-9.4	-9.4
Industrials	-18.3	-24.0
Information Technology	-23.4	-29.9
Materials	-20.9	-18.2
Real Estate	-15.7	-20.6
Utilities	-11.5	-11.6
Geography	2Q 2022	Trailing 12 Months
Europe EMU	-15.4	-23.4
Europe ex-EMU	-13.0	-10.2
Japan	-14.6	-19.6
Middle East	-19.9	-17.7
Pacific ex-Japan	-14.1	-14.8
MSCI EAFE Index	-14.3	-17.3

Source: FactSet (as of June 30, 2022). MSCI Inc. and S&P.

Swooning markets offered few places to hide. Global bonds, as measured by the Bloomberg Global-Aggregate Index, fell almost 10%. Commodities, stalwart performers since the roll of vaccines in late 2020, cracked in the closing weeks of the quarter as fears of recession overshadowed inflation. Crypto assets suffered a ferocious collapse accelerated by leveraged structures. Value stocks, whose discounted cash flows may be less impacted by rising rates, fared somewhat better than broad-based indexes. The MSCI EAFE Value Index has outperformed its Growth counterpart by nearly 15 percentage points in the year to date; the disparity between the performance of the most expensive and the cheapest quintiles of stocks was wide, at over 20%, although it had been even wider until growing recession fears led to a sell-off of shares of cyclical companies in late June. Even high-quality companies—those with higher profitability, more stable cash flows, and lower leverage—failed to provide refuge: the highest quintile of quality trailed the overall market by over 100 basis points for the quarter and over 500 basis points for the half year.

Swooning markets offered few places to hide, though value stocks fared somewhat better than the rest. The MSCI EAFE Value Index has outperformed its Growth counterpart by 15 percentage points in the year to date.

Expectations for more aggressive monetary tightening in the US boosted the US dollar relative to other major currencies. The Japanese yen sank to a 24-year low as the Bank of Japan intervened in the domestic bond market to keep long-term yields low.

Every sector finished in the red. Like last quarter, shares of companies sensitive to business confidence, such as those in Information Technology (IT) and Industrials, registered the biggest losses. Higher rates and their portent of expanding net interest margins did little for shares of Financials, as investors weighed the offsetting prospects of anemic loan growth and mounting defaults. Materials stocks fell alongside declines in iron ore and copper prices. Even the Energy sector sold off on a late fade in oil prices.

All regions declined. Other than tiny Middle East (which just contains Israel), the eurozone performed the worst, weighed down by fears that rapidly rising inflation could be further exacerbated should Russia further choke off the supply of natural gas to the continent.

Performance and Attribution

The EAFE Equity Composite fell 16.7% in the quarter, gross of fees, lagging the 14.3% decline for the MSCI EAFE Index.

Companies held in the portfolio at the end of the quarter appear in bold type; only the first reference to a particular holding appears in bold. The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings shown may not be current. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. It should not be assumed that investment in the security identified has been or will be profitable. A complete list of holdings at June 30, 2022 is available on page 9 of this report.

As in the prior quarter, investors fled from shares of high-quality growth companies. This quarter they also fled from cheaper stocks of slower-growing companies, which helped mitigate our underperformance relative to the benchmark (a small comfort, to be sure). While headwinds to high valuation and high growth began to subside, our emphasis on high business quality continued to drag on returns. The failure of shares of high-quality companies to provide protection is the subject of the next section.

Much of our underperformance also came from poor-performing stocks in the Health Care and Consumer Staples sectors. Swiss contract drug maker **Lonza** fell despite posting strong operating results as investors grew timorous toward expensive health care companies. Among Consumer Staples, **L'Oréal** and **Shiseido** fell in response to pandemic-related lockdowns in urban China, one of their biggest markets, while Brazilian brewer **Ambev** and Mexican bottling giant **FEMSA** fell on worries about rising input costs.

Financials was our strongest sector, driven by our position in Asian life insurance company **AIA Group**. Its recent results indicate that life insurance demand in the region has bottomed. Other helpful trends include rising interest rates, which make funding long-term liabilities easier, and (finally) the easing of Chinese lockdowns toward quarter end and rising hopes for a lifting of the border closure that has prevented mainlanders from traveling to Hong Kong, where they can purchase the more tailored health and investment-linked life policies. Asia-focused **Standard Chartered** also contributed as it continued to raise its return on equity through cost cuts and digitization advances. Good stocks in the Materials sector were another modestly positive counterweight. German fragrance and flavors maker **Symrise** rebounded as the company reported faster organic growth than expected, and management reaffirmed its 2022 guidance for strong revenue growth and margins.

From a geographic perspective, nearly all the portfolio's underperformance was localized in Europe. **Schneider Electric**, the French leader in energy management engineering, underperformed on concerns about the impact of the Shanghai lockdowns on its manufacturing and distribution in China, as well as broader supply chain and recession fears. Swedish industrial tool and equipment maker **Atlas Copco** slid on concerns about its revenue outlook in the face of decelerating economic growth. Pacific ex-Japan was one of the few regions that added to relative performance, mostly driven by the rebound in shares of Hong Kong-domiciled AIA.

Through the first half of 2022, the EAFE Equity Composite fell 23.9% gross of fees, well behind the 19.3% decline of the MSCI EAFE Index. A little over half of the year-to-date underperformance derived from our overweight skews toward the market's highest-quality companies and nearly a fifth from the first quarter write-downs of our two Russian holdings, **Lukoil** and **Yandex**. Most of the remaining balance came from poorly performing stocks within the Health Care, Industrials, and Consumer Staples sectors. Our underweight in Consumer Discretionary and our mining companies **BHP** and **Rio Tinto** were positive offsets.


Perspective and Outlook

Since our founding 33 years ago, we have stuck to the same approach: investing in reasonably priced shares of high-quality growing businesses. We want to own growing companies because the compounding of economic value creation is the foundation for long-term investor returns. We prefer high-quality businesses because they typically create more economic value and are more resilient in the face of adversity than lesser businesses. Moreover, because quality and growth are synergistic, the benefit of insisting on both factors can be greater than the sum of the factor parts. High-quality businesses can sustain their profitable growth over multiple business cycles, and there is greater visibility into their long-term cash flows than for companies whose businesses are more exposed to economic vagaries. Much of our focus is

Second Quarter 2022 Performance Attribution


Sector

EAFE Equity Composite vs. MSCI EAFE Index



Geography

EAFE Equity Composite vs. MSCI EAFE Index



¹Includes companies listed in the United States. Source: FactSet; Harding Loevner EAFE Equity Composite; MSCI Inc. and S&P. The total effect shown here may differ from the variance of the Composite performance and benchmark performance shown on the first page of this report due to the way in which FactSet calculates performance attribution. This information is supplemental to the Composite GIPS Presentation.

aimed at projecting uncertain future cash flows, handicapping them to account for risk, and continually monitoring fluctuations in the attendant valuations, which allows us to judge when to pounce on price declines in the shares of fundamentally strong businesses or—conversely—to take some of our exposure to strong and expensive businesses off the table. After all, returns are inextricably linked to what you paid (or could have received).

We've worried—and written—a good deal about the nosebleed valuations for the fastest-growing cohort of companies, and we've repeatedly trimmed our holdings of them to the point where, in the eyes of certain observers, we risked forsaking our reputation as bona fide growth investors. So, when the tide turned against the most expensive stocks of the growthiest companies in late 2020, we were relatively prepared.


We've worried—and written—a good deal about the nosebleed valuations for the market's fastest-growing companies. Recent market behavior shows we would have benefitted from having an equal level of concern about high valuations for high-quality companies.

Recent market behavior shows we would have benefitted from having an equal level of concern about high valuations for high-quality companies. Contrary to historical form, the shares of high-quality businesses have underperformed for two consecutive quarters in the teeth of a brutal market pullback. The poor shareholder returns of our portfolio companies in the market's highest-quality quintile, as measured by consistency of profitability, balance sheet strength, and free cash flow generation, among other metrics, has been disappointing.


Several interrelated factors explain why. Top of the list is price, as valuation premiums for quality coming into 2022 were higher than we've seen since the height of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008. Second is rising interest rates, which penalize the discounted-cash-flow-based valuations of companies with long-lived earnings streams disproportionately, a trait that is emblematic of quality companies. A third is that, because the rout appears largely to reflect retreating valuations, the absence thus far of the impact of an economic contraction on corporate earnings means the advantages held by intrinsically robust businesses have yet to be highlighted. Intriguingly, this raises the possibility that the relative performance of quality companies will improve should the nascent slowdown morph into an actual recession.

Our insistence that the companies in which we invest meet our quality and growth criteria is not just a philosophical holding, it is also a form of self-discipline. Our research process requires evaluation of a company in terms of quality and growth criteria before we consider its shares' valuation. The idea behind this rule is simple: addressing valuation too early in the process can cloud one's judgement about a business' fundamentals. So, we leave consideration of valuation for last. Consequently, we will miss out

Quality Outperformance During Drawdowns (bps)
MSCI ACWI ex-US Index (Total Returns, not annualized)



% of Down Market Periods Where Quality Outperformed
MSCI ACWI ex-US Index since 12/31/1998



Source: Bloomberg, MSCI Inc.

on some good-performing stocks of not-so-good companies. And we will sometimes spend a great deal of time and effort identifying and monitoring good companies whose stocks never become attractively priced enough for us to buy them.

Despite the inability of the shares of high-quality companies to distinguish themselves from high-priced growth stocks in this market correction thus far, we think it is only a matter of time before many "good companies" again become "good stocks." We don't know if the shares of high-quality companies have reached a trough, but, while the valuations of high-quality companies are still elevated relative to those of low-quality companies, that premium has declined during this year's sell-off. *That* puts us in a more favorable position to find excellent companies whose shares are priced to perform well in the years ahead.

Portfolio Highlights

We have regarded the financial services industry cautiously since well before the global financial crisis, concerned by the increasing prevalence in developed markets of slow-growing banks with poor risk management, and the assorted adventures by once-orthodox insurers like AIG. Heading into the crisis, we owned a couple of developed market companies (such as Swiss Re and Austria's Erste Bank) that ended up faring poorly. We also owned EM banks and insurers or developed market institutions with large EM businesses. These companies were less directly affected by the GFC, and afterward that's where we continued to focus, drawn by the higher long-term growth prospects of participants in EMs' still-immature financial sectors. At that time, growth prospects for developed market financial companies generally looked poor, asset quality was in doubt, and the path back to profitability was clouded.

Over subsequent years, as the better-managed businesses adjusted to increased capital requirements and more stringent regulation generally and the precarity of the post-crisis environment kept their shares reasonably valued even as customers returned to borrowing and transacting, we gradually increased our exposure to the sector. As central banks around the world have begun to raise interest rates over the past year, the growth outlook for some developed markets as well as EM financial companies has brightened considerably. Rising rates allow well-funded banks to raise their net interest margins, which, all else equal, should boost returns on equity substantially. Similarly, higher yields will raise the investment income of insurance companies in future years after the onetime hit to the mark-to-market value of their bond portfolios, making it easier for them to meet their long-term commitments to their policyholders. By the end of the quarter, we had reversed our longstanding underweight to the Financials sector to an overweight of over 2%—and increased our overweight position in its constituent insurance industry—through one new purchase and two additions to existing positions.


Manulife, the Canadian life insurer operating primarily in North America and Asia, is a new holding. Manulife offers a full suite of life insurance products as well as retirement and wealth management services. While the wealth management and retirement products appeal to the aging populations of the Western world, long-term life insurance products address the needs of the growing number of middle-class families in places like China and southeast Asia. COVID-19-induced lockdowns in China brought the shares down to a significant discount to our estimate of long-term value. The holding now serves as a nice diversifier to our Asia-centered insurers AIA and **Ping An Insurance**.

We added to existing positions in Swedish lender **SE Banken** and Standard Chartered. The former underperformed in recent months due to its exposure to the Nordics and Baltics, regions potentially threatened by Russian bellicosity. However, the unified Western response to the Ukraine crisis and Sweden's NATO application has helped alleviate this concern.

Outside of Financials, we purchased several companies that we had been monitoring for years, but whose stocks had not appeared reasonably priced until now. These included Kering, a Paris-based holding group for some of the world's most exclusive—and expensive—luxury clothing and accessory brands.

Standard Chartered's ongoing operational improvements and beneficial exposure to rising interest rates due to its hefty low-cost deposit base offset the Asian regional supply chain disruptions, which have dented some of the bank's fee-based business lines, and the regional geopolitical risks highlighted by the clampdown on political expression in Hong Kong.

HL EAFE Financials Sector Active Weight



Source: FactSet, MSCI Inc.

Outside of Financials, we purchased several companies that we had been monitoring for years, but whose stocks had not appeared reasonably priced until now:

Kering is a Paris-based luxury group, whose flagship Gucci brand is flanked by Yves Saint Laurent, Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga, and Alexander McQueen. Gucci's brand is engaging a younger and more diverse audience globally than stodgier competitors. **Daifuku** is a leading manufacturer of automated materials handling systems prevalent in logistics and manufacturing. It generates most of its sales outside of Japan while facing mostly domestic prices for its inputs, a combination that should make it a net beneficiary of yen weakness. Shiseido, whose strong skincare brands are particularly well-regarded throughout Asia, is another export-oriented business. We expect the company's revenues and profitability to resume their upward trajectory in the coming years as Japan and China recover from COVID-19 restrictions and as management emphasizes margin improvement with greater focus on a smaller number of premium products.

To buy we must also sell, so we sold a couple of stocks whose resilience saw them trading at levels above what we consider their fair value. Russia's invasion of Ukraine helped highlight cybersecurity threats, in which Israel-headquartered cybersecurity company Check Point specializes; however, we grew concerned about the company's long-term earnings growth outlook given faltering market share and the potential for increased labor costs. We also sold Diageo, the UK-based spirits and drinks producer known for premium brands such as Johnny Walker scotch and Guinness stout. Its shares, remarkably, have outperformed both the Consumer Staples sector and the broad market since the vaccine announcements in November 2020, as folks dashed back to their favorite watering holes to imbibe among friends. Ultimately, though, we grew nervous that this "re-opening" theme had spurred their price to levels unsupported by the company's long-term growth outlook.

Harding Loevner's Quality, Growth, and Value rankings are proprietary measures determined using objective data. Quality rankings are based on the stability, trend, and level of profitability, as well as balance sheet strength. Growth rankings are based on historical growth of earnings, sales, and assets, as well as expected changes in earnings and profitability. Value rankings are based on several valuation measures, including price ratios.

Demolition Work in Progress

By Edmund Bellord

After cheering asset prices higher for the best part of two decades, the developed world's central banks have dusted off their hard hats in preparation for a controlled demolition of real estate and equity prices. Naturally, much attention has focused on whether the central planners can tame inflation without crashing the real economy. Unfortunately, inflation is a syndrome—the manifestation of an interlocking set of imbalances between the real and financial economies. As such, it does not lend itself to being fine-tuned by even well-intentioned technocrats. Ultimately, the removal of monetary largess not only risks damaging real economic activity but also collapsing flimsy structures built up over 15 years of easy money.

Financial markets, among other things, act as a type of sieve that screens investments. Ideally, the riskiest tradable assets pass through to the strongest balance sheets. In practice, however, they often end up on the balance sheets of the most accommodating investors, owned not by those most capable of bearing risks, but rather those most willing to. A well-functioning market will tend to eliminate investors who exceed their risk-bearing capacity, while those who take on too little risk will see their returns shrink and their share of the capital base dwindle. On balance, this sifting mechanism helps to steer capital to its most productive uses.

Extended bull markets tend to interfere with this process, as rewards flow disproportionately to the most aggressive, over-confident, and complacent investors. This creates a powerful feedback loop, as unbridled risk-taking is rewarded with outperformance which in turn draws more capital. Once the process gets going, it is self-reinforcing as the newly attracted capital is plowed back into the same group of assets. But in so doing, fragilities increase, and the longer it persists the more distorted capital allocation becomes.

The implosion over the last six months (at least in terms of their asset prices) of profitless growth stocks, crypto assets, and other speculative creatures of the markets is emblematic of a reversal of this dynamic. Fears of outright deflation following the global financial crisis encouraged central banks to keep pushing interest rates lower to allow over-extended borrowers to heal, and to reduce the cost of capital for new investment in the hopes of kick-starting growth. At the same time, the total absence of inflationary pressures seduced central bankers to set aside worries about the dangers of money printing and unrestrained liquidity. By their own admission, the goal of their zero-interest monetary policy was to spur a positive wealth effect on spending, by pushing fearful, safety-minded investors into taking more risks, thus driving up valuations.¹

Primary beneficiaries of this process were growth stocks, particularly the most speculative growth stocks of companies with untried business models; their multiples steadily increased, inversely with submerging interest rates. This coincided with an explosion in indexation and so-called “smart beta” and factor investing, which channeled vast amounts of capital to the same group of stocks. Remarkably, for an extended period, some of these stocks were simultaneously defensive, fast growing, and relatively involatile, guaranteeing them an outsized weighting across a plethora of indices designed to track those very characteristics. Many active managers, faced with the prospect of having to beat a steadily narrowing benchmark, also piled in, overweighting these same stocks in the case of mutual funds, or owning them with leverage in the case of hedge funds. The prolonged success of these strategies encouraged yet more risk-taking, with new rafts of venture-backed startups and IPOs lacking anywhere near the prodigious free cash flows of the established tech companies. Moreover, the initial phases of the pandemic led to a last hurrah for tech stocks seemingly insulated from pandemic-induced disruptions to traditional commerce, which further turbocharged their valuations. The result was levitating valuations justified on the back of negative real interest rates.

The whole process was vulnerable to any shift in the macroeconomic backdrop that could prompt central banks to reverse course. The coils of that shift were arguably set by the pandemic and then sprung by the vaccine clinical trial results and rollouts which together upended consumption patterns, snarled supply chains, and reconfigured labor markets. According to the Bank for International Settlements, global growth, after cratering in 2020, accelerated to the fastest pace in almost five decades the following year.² The subsequent conflict in Ukraine exposed the fragility of an energy supply that had been undermined by a decade of underinvestment and climate-related antipathy, applying an energy supply shock to a combustible mix.

Now we will see just how difficult unwinding the unprecedented asset purchase programs and zero interest rate policies will be as central bank balance sheets shrink, interest rates rise, and the wealth effect goes into reverse. Policymakers embarked on their former policies with a clear-eyed view of the clear and present danger of deflation while the uncertain contingent costs inhabited a distant and abstract future. As that future arrives, the true costs are being revealed.

¹"Aiding the Economy: What the Fed Did and Why," Ben S. Bernanke, *The Washington Post* (November 4, 2010).

²BIS Annual Economic Report, Bank of International Settlements (June 26, 2022).

EAFE Holdings (as of June 30, 2022)

	Market	End Wt. (%)		Market	End Wt. (%)
Communication Services			Industrials		
Telkom Indonesia (Telecom services)	Indonesia	0.5	Alfa Laval (Industrial equipment manufacturer)	Sweden	1.5
Tencent (Internet and IT services)	China	1.3	Atlas Copco (Industrial equipment manufacturer)	Sweden	3.2
Yandex (Internet products and services)	Russia	0.0 ¹	Canadian National Railway (Railway operator)	Canada	1.2
Consumer Discretionary			Daifuku (Material-handling equipment manufacturer)	Japan	1.4
Haier Smart Home (Consumer appliances mfr.)	China	0.6	Epiroc (Industrial equipment manufacturer)	Sweden	1.5
Kering (Luxury goods manufacturer)	France	1.6	Fanuc (Industrial robot manufacturer)	Japan	0.9
NITORI (Home-furnishings retailer)	Japan	1.2	Komatsu (Industrial equipment manufacturer)	Japan	1.7
Consumer Staples			Kubota (Industrial and consumer equipment manufacturer)	Japan	1.6
Ambev (Alcoholic beverages manufacturer)	Brazil	0.3	Sanhua Intelligent Controls (HVAC&R parts mfr.)	China	0.4
Couche-Tard (Convenience stores operator)	Canada	1.4	Schneider Electric (Energy management products)	France	2.9
FEMSA (Beverages manufacturer and retail operator)	Mexico	0.5	SGS (Quality assurance services)	Switzerland	0.1
L'Oréal (Cosmetics manufacturer)	France	4.1	Information Technology		
Nestlé (Foods manufacturer)	Switzerland	1.9	Adyen (Payment processing services)	Netherlands	2.4
Shiseido (Personal care products manufacturer)	Japan	1.4	Dassault Systèmes (CAD software developer)	France	1.7
Unicharm (Consumer products manufacturer)	Japan	1.9	Infineon Technologies (Semiconductor manufacturer)	Germany	3.0
Energy			Keyence (Sensor and measurement eqpt. mfr.)	Japan	1.4
Lukoil (Oil and gas producer)	Russia	0.0 ¹	Samsung Electronics (Electronics manufacturer)	South Korea	1.2
Royal Dutch Shell (Oil and gas producer)	UK	2.7	SAP (Enterprise software developer)	Germany	1.6
Woodside ² (Oil and gas producer)	Australia	0.5	TSMC (Semiconductor manufacturer)	Taiwan	0.8
Financials			Materials		
AIA Group (Insurance provider)	Hong Kong	4.1	Air Liquide (Industrial gases producer)	France	1.4
Allianz (Financial services and insurance provider)	Germany	3.0	BHP (Mineral miner and processor)	Australia	3.4
BBVA (Commercial bank)	Spain	1.8	Linde (Industrial gases supplier and engineer)	US	1.7
DBS Group (Commercial bank)	Singapore	3.4	Novozymes (Biotechnology producer)	Denmark	1.2
HDFC Bank (Commercial bank)	India	0.4	Rio Tinto (Mineral miner and processor)	UK	2.5
ICICI Bank (Commercial bank)	India	0.6	Symrise (Fragrances and flavors manufacturer)	Germany	1.7
Manulife (Financial services and insurance provider)	Canada	1.7	Real Estate		
Ping An Insurance (Insurance provider)	China	0.3	No Holdings		
SE Banken (Commercial bank)	Sweden	2.2	Utilities		
Standard Chartered (Commercial bank)	UK	2.2	ENN Energy (Gas pipeline operator)	China	0.5
XP (Broker dealer and financial services)	Brazil	0.2	Cash		
Health Care					
Alcon (Eye care products manufacturer)	Switzerland	2.1			
Chugai Pharmaceutical (Pharma manufacturer)	Japan	1.5			
CSPC Pharmaceutical Group (Pharma manufacturer)	China	0.5			
Lonza (Life science products manufacturer)	Switzerland	2.6			
Roche (Pharma and diagnostic equipment manufacturer)	Switzerland	4.0			
Shionogi (Pharma manufacturer)	Japan	1.8			
Sonova Holding (Hearing aids manufacturer)	Switzerland	1.7			
Sysmex (Clinical laboratory equipment manufacturer)	Japan	1.2			

¹Since March 7 we have valued our Russian holdings at effectively zero due to an inability to trade their shares and no observable market prices to use as proxies. ²Woodside was received as part of a corporate action due to the portfolio's shareholding in BHP.

Model Portfolio holdings are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant EAFE Equity Composite GIPS Presentation. The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings shown may not be current. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. It should not be assumed that investment in the security identified has been or will be profitable. To request a complete list of portfolio holdings for the past year contact Harding Loevner.

2Q22 Contributors to Relative Return (%)

Largest Contributors	Sector	Avg. Weight		Effect
		HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE	
AIA Group	FINA	3.5	0.8	0.46
Standard Chartered	FINA	1.5	0.1	0.27
ASML*	INFT	–	1.6	0.26
Haier Smart Home	DSCR	0.7	–	0.17
Unicharm	STPL	2.2	0.1	0.15

Last 12 Mos. Contributors to Relative Return (%)

Largest Contributors	Sector	Avg. Weight		Effect
		HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE	
DBS Group	FINA	3.1	0.3	0.45
Royal Dutch Shell	ENER	2.0	1.1	0.36
Check Point	INFT	1.2	0.1	0.34
Standard Chartered	FINA	1.0	0.1	0.33
Alcon	HLTH	2.3	0.2	0.30

2Q22 Detractors from Relative Return (%)

Largest Detractors	Sector	Avg. Weight		Effect
		HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE	
Infineon Technologies	INFT	3.3	0.3	-0.51
Atlas Copco	INDU	3.4	0.3	-0.44
Schneider Electric	INDU	3.2	0.5	-0.42
Adyen	INFT	2.5	0.2	-0.35
Alfa Laval	INDU	1.6	0.1	-0.27

Last 12 Mos. Detractors from Relative Return (%)

Largest Detractors	Sector	Avg. Weight		Effect
		HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE	
Infineon Technologies	INFT	3.9	0.3	-0.81
Atlas Copco	INDU	4.0	0.4	-0.74
Systemex	HLTH	1.9	0.1	-0.69
Adyen	INFT	3.2	0.3	-0.64
NITORI	DSCR	1.5	0.1	-0.50

*Company was not held in the portfolio; its absence had an impact on the portfolio's return relative to the Index.

Portfolio Characteristics

Quality and Growth	HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE
Profit Margin ¹ (%)	14.2	11.1
Return on Assets ¹ (%)	8.2	5.7
Return on Equity ¹ (%)	13.9	13.1
Debt/Equity Ratio ¹ (%)	44.4	72.0
Std. Dev. of 5 Year ROE ¹ (%)	3.3	4.5
Sales Growth ^{1,2} (%)	6.7	4.6
Earnings Growth ^{1,2} (%)	12.0	9.6
Cash Flow Growth ^{1,2} (%)	8.9	6.4
Dividend Growth ^{1,2} (%)	7.9	5.2
Size and Turnover	HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE
Wtd. Median Mkt. Cap. (US \$B)	44.9	41.8
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap. (US \$B)	87.0	73.3
Turnover ³ (Annual %)	14.3	–

Risk and Valuation	HL EAFE	MSCI EAFE
Alpha ² (%)	3.17	–
Beta ²	0.96	–
R-Squared ²	0.91	–
Active Share ³ (%)	83	–
Standard Deviation ² (%)	15.84	15.72
Sharpe Ratio ²	0.30	0.10
Tracking Error ² (%)	4.7	–
Information Ratio ²	0.66	–
Up/Down Capture ²	110/95	–
Price/Earnings ⁴	15.8	12.4
Price/Cash Flow ⁴	12.6	8.4
Price/Book ⁴	2.3	1.6
Dividend Yield ⁵ (%)	2.8	3.3

¹Weighted median; ²Trailing five years, annualized; ³Five-year average; ⁴Weighted harmonic mean; ⁵Weighted mean. Source (Risk characteristics): eVestment Alliance (eA); Harding Loevner EAFE Composite, based on the Composite returns; MSCI Inc. Source (other characteristics): FactSet (Run Date: July 6, 2022, based on the latest available data in FactSet on this date.); Harding Loevner EAFE Model, based on the underlying holdings; MSCI Inc.

Completed Portfolio Transactions

Positions Established	Market	Sector	Positions Sold	Market	Sector
Daifuku	Japan	INDU	Check Point	Israel	INFT
Kering	France	DSCR	Diageo	UK	STPL
Manulife	Canada	FINA	SGS	Switzerland	INDU
Shiseido	Japan	STPL			
Woodside ¹	Australia	ENER			

¹Woodside was received as part of a corporate action due to the portfolio's shareholding in BHP.

The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings identified above do not represent all of the securities held in the portfolio and holdings may not be current. It should not be assumed that investment in the securities identified has been or will be profitable. The following information is available upon request: (1) information describing the methodology of the contribution data in the tables above; and (2) a list showing the weight and relative contribution of all holdings during the quarter and the last 12 months. Past performance does not guarantee future results. In the tables above, "weight" is the average percentage weight of the holding during the period, and "contribution" is the contribution to overall relative performance over the period. Contributors and detractors exclude cash and securities in the Composite not held in the Model Portfolio. Quarterly data is not annualized. Portfolio attribution and characteristics are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant EAFE Equity Composite GIPS Presentation. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

EAFE Equity Composite Performance (as of June 30, 2022)

	HL EAFE Gross (%)	HL EAFE Net (%)	MSCI EAFE Index ¹ (%)	HL EAFE 3-yr. Std. Deviation ² (%)	MSCI EAFE 3-yr. Std. Deviation ² (%)	Internal Dispersion ³ (%)	No. of Accounts	Composite Assets (\$M)	Firm Assets (\$M)
2022 YTD ⁴	-23.88	-24.08	-19.25	17.54	17.75	N.A. ⁵	16	655	50,423
2021	12.67	12.13	11.78	15.84	16.89	0.6	12	878	75,084
2020	23.89	23.26	8.28	17.19	17.87	3.2	13	981	74,496
2019	26.77	26.10	22.66	11.70	10.80	0.5	7	655	64,306
2018	-11.72	-12.20	-13.36	11.51	11.27	0.4	7	545	49,892
2017	29.48	28.85	25.62	12.03	11.85	0.4	7	643	54,003
2016	6.97	6.34	1.51	12.74	12.48	N.M. ⁶	4	270	38,996
2015	2.53	1.96	-0.39	12.48	12.47	N.M.	1	99	33,296
2014	-0.93	-1.51	-4.48	11.67	12.99	N.M.	4	240	35,005
2013	18.73	17.95	23.29	15.25	16.22	N.M.	4	241	33,142
2012	20.88	20.11	17.90	+	+	N.M.	1	76	22,658

¹Benchmark index; ²Variability of the Composite, gross of fees, and the index returns over the preceding 36-month period, annualized; ³Asset-weighted standard deviation (gross of fees); ⁴The 2022 YTD performance returns and assets shown are preliminary; ⁵N.A.—Internal dispersion less than a 12-month period; ⁶N.M.—Information is not statistically significant due to an insufficient number of portfolios in the Composite for the entire year; +Less than 36 months of return data.

The EAFE Equity Composite contains fully discretionary, fee-paying accounts investing in non-US equity and equity-equivalent securities and cash reserves, and is measured against the MSCI EAFE Total Return Index (Gross) for comparison purposes. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. The exchange rate source of the benchmark is Reuters. The exchange rate source of the Composite is Bloomberg. Additional information about the benchmark, including the percentage of composite assets invested in countries or regions not included in the benchmark, is available upon request.

The MSCI EAFE Index (Europe, Australasia, Far East) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure developed market equity performance, excluding the US and Canada. The Index consists of 21 developed market countries. You cannot invest directly in this index.

Harding Loevner LP claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Harding Loevner has been independently verified for the period November 1, 1989 through March 31, 2022.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The EAFE Equity Composite has had a performance examination for the periods March 1, 2010 through March 31, 2022. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Harding Loevner LP is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Harding Loevner is an affiliate of Affiliated Managers Group, Inc. (NYSE: AMG), an investment holding company with stakes in a diverse group of boutique firms. A list of composite descriptions, a list of limited distribution pooled fund descriptions, and a list of broad distribution pooled funds are available upon request.

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite performance is presented gross of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income and capital gains. Additional information is available upon request. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

The US dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented both gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net returns are calculated using actual fees. Actual returns will be reduced by investment advisory fees and other expenses that may be incurred in the management of the account. The standard fee schedule generally applied to separate EAFE Equity accounts is 1.00% annually of the market value for the first \$20 million; 0.50% for the next \$80 million; 0.45% for the next \$150 million; 0.40% for the next \$250 million; above \$500 million upon request. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year.

The EAFE Equity Composite was created on February 28, 2010, and the performance inception date is March 1, 2010.

This page intentionally left blank.